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AGENDA FOR "SUMMIT" MEET

I. USSR is continuing drumfire of diplomatic moves designed to:

- A. Cash in on highly dramatized Soviet "liberality" on Austrian treaty.
- B. Take credit for prospect of reduction international tension at "summit" meeting this summer.
- C. Persuade West Europeans in particular and non-Communist world generally:
 - 1. That USSR wants major East-West detente and reciprocal disarmament
 - 2. Within this context, that rearmament West Germany is menace to European peace and security, rather than gain of strength for NATO coalition.

II. Although these Soviet moves are full of propaganda, they are not just propaganda gimmicks:

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worked out and coordinated as carefully as any of Zhukov's massive battlefield assaults.

B. Positions being set forth in advance represent Soviet agenda for "summit" meeting.

C. Aim--weaken US position in Western Europe; stop (or minimize) rearmament West Germany.

III. Main lines of Soviet negotiating position at "summit" laid down in elaborate proposals on disarmament and ending cold war--sprung last week at London talks and, since then, plugged heavily by Soviet leaders.

A. Core of position is Soviet willingness to agree to:

1. Reasonably realistic disarmament scheme;

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2. System of general security guaran-

tees of any kind (LOCARNO or UN regional grouping) that would satisfy West Europeans as manifest of Soviet peaceful intent.

IV. USSR can go long way in negotiating from this position because:

- A. General war in Europe not in Soviet interest in foreseeable future:
- B. Pushing US off Eurasian continent easier by political pressures on Western Europeans than by military moves, which Soviet leaders know are very dangerous in hydrogen age.
- C. In process, USSR is trying to capture good words in popular lexicon, like "peace"--"disarmament"--"neutrality" and "independence" of small nations.
- D. By contrast, USSR portrays US as advocating high-levels military expenditures keynoting imminence of war, and demanding that all nations line up "for or against" USSR.

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week were:

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- A. Demonstration of "good faith" in sending Molotov, amid fanfare and rejoicing, to sign Austrian treaty on schedule
 - B. Molotov's prompt acceptance of US-UK-French invitation for "summit" meeting.
 - C. Bulganin's conclusion of Warsaw Pact.
- VI. Establishment of this 8-power Soviet Bloc treaty group (pledged to friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance) also brought into being a long-anticipated "unified" Eastern European military force.
- Twists at Warsaw: language carefully made clear that:
- A. Non-Communist states will be welcomed into Pact;
 - B. Pact, together with its military defense system, would lapse when and if a general European security treaty

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both Warsaw defense group and NATO are made obsolete by future reduction of world tension, agreement on disarmament, and conclusion of general mutual security system.

VII. Most special gimmick of all at Warsaw-- announcement that participation of East German armed forces in "unified" command would "be examined later."

- A. This saving-out of East Germany as bargaining counter is probably most serious sign that USSR means business in negotiations at "summit."
- B. Ambassador Bohlen said several weeks ago tipoff to earnestness of Soviet wish for a settlement of the German problem would be failure to incorporate East Germany in Warsaw defense system on same basis as other Satellites.

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man settlement not in any sense a Soviet willingness to surrender.

- A. USSR may hope to sell scheme of reciprocal armament limitations in "two Germanies," as part of general security system.
- B. Some such scheme foreshadowed by 10 May Soviet proposal for strict limitation of local police contingents in both parts of Germany.
- C. Under such an arrangement (and with considerable reduction of tension), USSR might in long run be willing withdraw most of its powerful military forces from East Germany; count on political power and security police to maintain essential Soviet control.
- D. In this way USSR could impose safe limits on West German contribution to NATO without giving up East Germany.

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